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bers' orthodoxy or deviance. The members ' "mental health" is medicalized and 
made the sole prerogative of the psychiatric profession. The psychiatrist rather 
than the priest, rabbi, or minister determines acceptable behavior, exorcises the 
deviant, and counsels the legislator on the formulation of laws aimed at maintain-
ing the status quo. 
The media, with its own stake in selling papers and promoting its TV ratings , is 
tempted to manipulate the news to its own purposes. Cults make good copy and 
create interest, so they are exploited by the media beyond their own importance 
and influence. What is of importance is the effect that this kind of reporting has 
on popular sentiments and the pension of legislators to respond to these popular 
hysterics. The real question is whether the current cult phenomenon in our present 
society is of such a magnitude or danger that it warrants the inauguration of 
legislation which could seriously threaten the religious freedom which is a funda-
mental right guaranteed by the Constitution. The numbers involved and the 
results of recent government investigations seem to indicate that we do not need 
to institute another Inquisition to insure the maintenance of our current secular-
istic status quo. 
Understanding conversion as a normal part of the process of human develop-
ment is an important insight gleaned from present theological reflection. When 
viewed in the context of the conversion of certain historical figures, the conver-
sions of many of our present-day idealistic youths do not appear as spectacular 
and unusual as we are led to be lieve. The fact that some young people today have 
turned from commonly accepted standards in search of a fuller mea ning in their 
lives through new forms of religious expression may cause many to feel uncom-
fortaple at their own unexamined life, but this discomfort should not stampede 
our society into legislating away the very religious freedom which our people 
enjoy. This book has done well in raising and clarifying the issues surrounding 
religious cults. With its insights , perhaps the efforts to "save" the few will not 
result in the destruction of the religious freedoms of the many. The latter loss 
would be far greater than the first. 
- Joseph H. Determan, O .P. 
Mental Health Chaplain Supervisor 
St. Elizabeth Hospital, Washington, D.C. 
Toward a Reformulation of Natural Law 
by Anthony Battaglia 
Seabury, New York, 1981, 150 pages, $14.95. 
Battaglia presents here a modified version of the natural law theory, by which 
he tries to steer a middle course between absolutism (immutable precepts) an d 
complete relativism (no grounding of precepts in reality). His version is supposed 
to be faith ful to the central insights of St. Thomas Aquinas - whom he calls the 
greatest of the natural law theorists (p. 4) - while developing his thought with an 
eye to modern problems, especially that of "historicity." 
Battaglia argues that , for Aquinas, our knowledge not only of God, but also of 
creatures, can be only analogical , no t univocal. He then interpre ts "analogica l 
knowledge" to mean partially fa lse, " reform ul able," and uncertain. According to 
Battaglia, Aquinas held that we know things not as they really are but only in 
te rms of our knowing power (p. 41); we know not the essences of things but only 
their appearances (p. 141). 
August, 1982 281 
The reason for Aquinas's position is supposed to be that "the truth of things'" 
consists in their conformity to God's mind, but since we do not know God's 
mind, we cannot know the truth of things (p. 32). We are told that Aquinas is 
assured that our knowledge is in some sense true of things only by a theological 
belief that our first principles are a sharing in the divine light (p. 41). 
Aquinas allegedly applies this general skepticism on human knowledge to the 
particular question of our knowledge of the human good or of natural law. So 
Aquinas believes that the first principles of morality provide an assurance of some 
type of conformity to the divine will (pp. 46, 47). But these principles, Battaglia 
argues, are only tautologies - "Good is to be done , evil avoided," "Unjust killing 
is evil," as if to say, "Do not do what is immoral." Since only these first principles 
are immutable, the result is that every moral precept stated non-tautologically is 
culturally conditioned and changeable (p. 56). 
The moral criterion Battaglia retrieves from Aquinas is explained in the last 
part of the book. On the one hand, what is reasonable is "a function of whatever 
community one seems to belong to " (p. 104). But on the other hand , our judg-
ments about the human good are testable. If our moral system works, then that is 
an indication of its adequacy (at least partial) to human nature (p. 129). 
On this view, changes in morality are analogous to developments in empirical 
sc ience (at least on the interpretation of relativist philosophers of science, such as 
T. S. Kuhn, m entioned by Battaglia). Both develop according to a hypothetical 
m ethod; both are ever changing, sometimes gradually, sometimes abruptly . As 
empirical science works only with a paradigm of reality, which is not absolutely 
true but accepted mere ly as a basis for work (on the conceptual relativists ' inter-
pretation), so also does morality. "It is from the paradigm of what a human being 
is that we generate a notion of what a human being ought to be if he is to be 
happy, or rather these are already outlined for us in the culture" (p. 134). Thus 
Battaglia's middle course. 
The book abounds in scholarly ineptitudes. For example, to support his read-
ing of Aquinas on human knowledge, Battaglia quotes Aquinas to the effect that 
we know things "not by their essence but by their similitudes" (Battaglia's transla-
tion of a phrase from the Summa Theologiae, part I , question 87, article 1). 
Battaglia interprets this to mean that for Aquinas we know only the appearances 
of things (pp. 38, 46). Consulting the text one finds that a) Aquinas is there 
talking about angels, not men , and b) Battaglia has mistranslated and the phrase 
should read, "The angel cannot know all things through its own essence, but it 
knows things oth er than itself through their similitudes." For Aquinas, to know 
by means of a similitude is not the same as to know merely a similitude; both 
angels and men know things themselves but by means of similitudes. 
Again, on p. 50, Battaglia cites Germain Grisez's article on Aquinas's first 
principle of practica l reason, to support the argument that Aquinas 's position on 
knowledge differs from Kant's only in that Aquinas h as a theological assurance of 
the "truth " of first principles. In that article, however, Grisez.says the opposite of 
what is claimed. One wonders whether Battaglia read the article. 
R egarding his general interpretation of Aquinas, only three points will be men-
tioned. Battaglia does claim that his reading of Aquinas "is grounded in his texts 
and can certainly be read as a valid understanding of his thinking" (p. 4). 
First, on Aquinas 's theory, "analogical" has nothing to do with " partially 
false" or "uncertain" or "changeable." The proposition, God exists, is known 
analogically; it is neither partially false, somewhat uncertain, nor subject to 
change. Moreover, it is not the case that for Aquinas all our knowledge of crea-
tures (specifically, of the human good) is analogical, or that we must know God's 
mind to know truth (the "truth of things" as their conformity to God's mind is a 
secondary and derived sense of the word "truth"). 
Secondly , Battaglia attributes to Aquinas the argument that since the human 
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good, or happiness, is the criterion of morality, and since God is the happiness of 
human beings and we do not apprehend God, it follows that we have no firm 
grasp of a criterion of morality (pp. 58-61). Soon after, Aquinas 's "skepticism" is 
compared with that of Hume (p. 118). But for Aquinas, when a man acts in 
conformity with right reason (reason made right by a respect for the basic human 
goods, the objects of man's natural inclinations), then his action is in fact ordered 
to the ultimate end (by being open to it, at least) , though he may not be con-
scious of tha t order. 
Thirdly, in the second part of his Summa Theologiae Aquinas classifies more 
than 40 types of acts as always morally evil or sinful, including such acts as killing 
the innocent, suicide, lying, adultery, rape, incest, etc. It is difficult to believe that 
this same thinker held that the only immutable precepts were tautological, not to 
mention the problem of why he might think a set of tautologies is so important. 
In fact, for Aquinas , the primary, immutable precepts of the natural law are not 
tautological. These precepts oblige that man pursue and avoid acting against (with-
out exception) specific, real human goods, such as life, truth, the procreative 
good, etc. 
Regarding Battaglia's argument itself, apart from historical accuracy, three 
points will be made. First, all of the problems that plagued the old (and innacurate) 
interpretation of Aquinas's moral criterion as "human nature adequately con-
sidered," remain problems for this theory. Whether the nature be "adequately 
considered" or something of which we have merely a "paradigm ," there remains 
the logical problem of how one passes from "man's nature is x" to "man ought to 
do y." The only difference is that Battaglia makes the first premise uncertain; the 
logical sequence he leaves unclarified. (Battaglia adverts to Aquinas's distinction 
between practical truth and speculative truth, but reduces practical truth to truth 
about the human good; in Aquinas's view the latter is still speculative. The distinc-
tion lies elsewhere.) 
Secondly, Battaglia never, in fact, even tries to prove that there are no 
immutable precepts. He does try to show that this is Aquinas's position. But 
obviously Battaglia would not accept one of the premises in what is supposed to 
be Aquinas's argument, nam ely that truth consists solely in a thing 's conformity 
to God's mind (which is not Aquinas's position anyway). Hence the relativist part 
of his thesis rests solely upon a doubly bad argument from authority . 
Thirdly, the conclusion suffers from internal difficulties. The basic argument is 
that historical relativity is compatible with moral judgments being based in human 
nature, in that moral systems are paradigms which are testable by their conse-
quences: "only paradigms which are adequate to human nature will work" (p. 
127). The difficulty is that what constitutes "working," on the supposition of 
historical relativity, will itself have to be judged by a second uncertain paradigm. 
Hence the theory either begs the question or amounts to embracing whatever the 
going ideology happens to be. 
This view of morality can scarcely be called a "natural law theory," revised or 
not. If " natural law" means anything, it means what we know, what is "written in 
our hearts," what even pagans know, not hypothesize or construct "paradigms" 
about. Furthermore (as briefly indicated above) , Battaglia 's theory really has 
nothing to do ,with Aquinas's - even though it might have occurred to Battaglia 
while perusing the Summa Theologiae. It seems to me that the only reason Battag-
lia thinks otherwise on these points is in order to construct an ad populum 
argument aimed at Catholic audiences. 
In short , the arguments are inept , the scholarship is incompetent. I do not 
recommend the book. 
August, 1982 
- Patrick Lee 
Center for Thomistic Studies 
University of St. Thomas, Houston 
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